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THE CYBERSECURITY THREAT:
COMPLIANCE AND THE ROLE OF
WHISTLEBLOWERS
Jennifer M. Pacella*
ABSTRACT
In today’s technologically dependent world, concerns about
cybersecurity, data breaches, and compromised personal information
infiltrate the news almost daily. The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has recently emerged as a regulator that is keenly focused on
cybersecurity, specifically with respect to encouraging disclosures in this
arena by regulated entities. Although the SEC has issued non-binding
“guidance” to help companies navigate their reporting obligations in this
sector, the agency lacks binding cybersecurity disclosure regulations as they
pertain generally to public companies. Given that the SEC has already relied
on such guidance in threatening enforcement actions, reporting companies
are increasingly pressured for compliance in this arena. This Article
addresses the importance of establishing effective internal reporting
channels and other internal compliance mechanisms in meeting the SEC’s
expectations and highlights the role of “cybersecurity whistleblowers,”
specifically those reporting internally, in building the type of improved
corporate culture necessary to discover and remediate cybersecurity risks.
Cybersecurity whistleblowers, like all whistleblowers, commonly experience
retaliation for their efforts. Despite the SEC’s commitment to providing
whistleblowers retaliation protections through statutes like the SarbanesOxley and Dodd-Frank Acts, the absence of binding cybersecurity
regulations translates into a direct problem for cybersecurity whistleblowers,
because their reports are likely to fall outside the scope of “protected
activity” enumerated under these statutes. This Article discusses this gap in
protections in light of the SEC’s heightened cybersecurity focus, the
feasibility of SEC adoption of binding cybersecurity disclosure regulations,
and the broad contributions of whistleblowers to compliance systems
generally.

* Professor Jennifer Pacella is an Assistant Professor of Law at the City University of New
York (CUNY), Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, in Manhattan, and an Adjunct Professor
at State University of New York (SUNY) Buffalo Law School. The author expresses gratitude to
James Fanto and Brooklyn Law School for the invitation to present this article as part of the annual
Symposium of the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law, and thanks all of
the Symposium participants for their feedback and insights. The author also thanks Guyora Binder,
Joseph Gerken, Michael Halberstam, James G. Milles, Matthew Steilen, Rick Su, Larry Trautman,
Jay Weiser, and David Zaring for their valuable comments on prior drafts of this article. The author
would also like to thank each of the discussants and participants of the Sixteenth Huber Hurst
Research Seminar, sponsored by the University of Florida’s Warrington College of Business, for
their very helpful feedback on an earlier version of this article.

40

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 11

INTRODUCTION
In today’s compliance-focused environment, the need to detect and
remediate problems of potentially alarming degrees is essential to ensuring
effective regulation. Information security systems and technologically savvy
business practices are conducive to success in this digital era and have
emerged as important tools in compliance monitoring, as they allow
compliance officers to identify and address problems through automated
reporting and review channels.1 Although reliance on technology is
unquestionably important in the regulation of modern-day business and
financial services industries, it simultaneously carries the associated risk of
vulnerability to data breaches and other cybersecurity-related threats. The
potentially devastating consequences of these threats present compliance
challenges for all industries.
Whistleblowers, especially those reporting internally, have emerged as
critical players in compliance, bringing red flags to the forefront to ensure
that their places of employment are continuously operating within the
confines of the law.2 “Cybersecurity whistleblowers,” defined herein as
individuals who escalate concerns regarding internal management of cyberrisks, cyber threats, data breaches, or other cybersecurity related information
to supervisors, compliance officers, and boards of directors, play a crucial
role in the modern-day compliance functions of regulated entities. The role
of whistleblowers generally in corporate compliance and as an “institution”
in modern corporate governance has received relatively minimal scholarly
attention.3
Whistleblowers are important to good corporate governance and
compliance because they are essentially “volunteers” with no pre-existing
duty to come forward and often do so out of a personal interest to conform to

1. See Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an Era of
Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 203, 214 (2016) (“Compliance work can also involve training
specialists in the enterprise to work with software or other technology to ensure that the process of
monitoring compliance practices occurs smoothly.”); see James A. Fanto, Advising Compliance in
Financial Firms: A New Mission for the Legal Academy, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 10
(2013) (discussing how today’s “compliance monitoring is aided by technology”); see generally
Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in A Digital Age, 88
TEX. L. REV. 669 (2010) (discussing the use of technology in compliance and risk management).
2. See GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND
COMPLIANCE 271 (2014) (describing whistleblowing as “an increasingly important mechanism for
enhancing an organization’s compliance with legal norms”); Jennifer M. Pacella, Advocate or
Adversary? When Attorneys Act as Whistleblowers, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1027, 1061 (2015)
(internal citations omitted) (discussing the contributions of whistleblowers to compliance,
especially with respect to strengthening internal reporting channels).
3. See Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the New
Era of Dodd-Frank Act “Bounty Hunting,” 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 485 (2012) (noting that most
whistleblowing scholarship highlights the “unwillingness or incapacity of employees to blow the
whistle”).
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legal rules and norms.4 Contrary to what may be popular belief, most
whistleblowers report internally, rather than externally to the government or
third parties, and are often considered very “loyal” employees.5 In this way,
they provide significant value to an entity’s internal compliance function by
raising issues that may otherwise remain unnoticed or ignored. Despite their
value, retaliation against whistleblowers remains common, often manifesting
itself as retaliatory discharge, ostracism, alienation, job stagnation, or
blacklisting.6
One of the most increasingly vocal regulators in both the areas of
cybersecurity and whistleblower protections is the Securities & Exchange
Commission (SEC). The SEC has called upon entities to publicly disclose the
cybersecurity and technology-related risks that they face because of the
significant impact that the agency believes these issues have on shareholders
in making investment decisions.7 In October of 2011, the SEC issued nonbinding guidance (the 2011 Guidance) alerting public companies to alreadyexisting disclosure requirements that would capture cybersecurity risks and
cyber-incidents as material information subject to mandatory disclosure for
investors.8 This focus on disclosure was emphasized in the SEC’s Roundtable
on Cybersecurity, held in March of 2014 (the Roundtable), in which the
4. See MILLER, supra note 2, at 271–72 (noting that a whistleblower reports misconduct
without being required to do so).
5. See, e.g., Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757,
1760 (2007) (noting that “internal reporting is the most common type of initial whistleblowing”);
Christopher M. Matthews, Most Whistleblowers Report Internally, Study Finds, WALL ST. J. (May
30, 2012, 9:25 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/05/30/most-whistleblowersreport-internally-study-finds/ (citing an Ethics Resource Center survey finding that in 2011, only
2% of employee-whistleblowers reported externally); Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s
Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1158 (2006);
Robert G. Vaughn, Statutory Protection of Whistleblowers in the Federal Executive Branch, 1982
U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 616 n.6 (1982) (“[W]histleblowers are often the most loyal employees.”).
6. See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara, Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The
Mouth of Truth, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 37, 56–57 (2013) (noting that it is common for
whistleblowers to experience some sort of reprisal, although not all may experience severe
retaliation); see generally ETHICS RES. CTR., RETALIATION: WHEN WHISTLEBLOWERS BECOME
VICTIMS A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE 2011 NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 2 (2012);
see also Proof of Retaliation Against Whistleblowers Grows Exponentially According to NAVEX
Global’s 2015 Ethics and Compliance Hotline Benchmark Report, NAVEX GLOBAL (Mar. 10,
2015), http://www.navexglobal.com/company/press-room/proof-retaliation-against-whistleblower
s-grows-exponentially-according-navex.
7. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Statement at SEC Roundtable
on Cybersecurity (Mar. 26, 2014) [hereinafter White Statement], http://www.sec.gov/News/Public
Stmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370541286468.
8. Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance
-topic2.htm [hereinafter CF-2 Disclosure Guidance]; see also Constance E. Bagley, Joshua Mitts
& Richard J. Tinsley, Snake Oil Salesmen or Purveyors of Knowledge: Off-Label Promotions and
the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 372 (2013) (discussing the
mandatory disclosure regulatory regime of the SEC and the way in which mandatory disclosure
“reduc[es] misallocation of resources” and ensures that consumers have access to essential
information).
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agency solicited views about managing cybersecurity from various players in
the industry, academics, attorneys, SEC staff, and the general public.9
At the same time, the SEC has taken a firm stance on protecting
whistleblowers from retaliation and encouraging them to report wrongdoing.
SEC Chair, Mary Jo White, recently discussed the “invaluable public
service” that whistleblowers provide, urging companies, especially in the
years since the financial crisis, to set aside whatever “mixed feelings” they
may have traditionally harbored about whistleblowers and consider them as
key players in the “new, more aggressive ways” of improving compliance
and corporate culture.10 Chair White also stated that the SEC increasingly
views itself as “the whistleblower’s advocate” and noted that the
whistleblower program of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), enacted in 2010, “has proven to be
a game changer.”11 Dodd-Frank offers strong retaliation protections for
whistleblowers who report on violations of the securities laws, including a
private right of action in federal court, a lengthy statute of limitations, double
back pay, and bounty rewards.12 Although retaliation protections are also
available for whistleblowers under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX),
this statute offers only an administrative remedy of filing a retaliation
complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
and a shorter statute of limitations.13
In light of the key roles that information gathering and internal reporting
play in managing the compliance function,14 this Article proposes that
cybersecurity whistleblowers are essential to helping meet the demands of
the SEC’s rapidly developing reporting requirements. The emerging
phenomenon of cybersecurity whistleblowing has been deemed “the next
wave of SEC whistleblowing,”15 and the relationship between
whistleblowers in this sector, retaliation protections, and compliance is ripe
for scholarly attention. Compliance in this arena has become even more
important given that the SEC has started to bring enforcement actions against
9. See generally White Statement, supra note 7.
10. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech, The SEC as the Whistleblower’s

Advocate, Ray Garrett, Jr. Corporate and Securities Law Institute-Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law
Chicago, Illinois (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-remarks-at-garrettinstitute.html.
11. Id.
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), Pub. L. No. 94-29, §17, 89 Stat. 97 (1975)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)).
13. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012)).
14. See White Statement, supra note 7; Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations,
OCIE’s 2015 Cybersecurity Examination Initiative, NAT’L EXAM PROGRAM RISK ALERT, Sept.
2015, at 1 (noting the importance of governance and risk assessment, employee training, internal
controls, and other related measures as essential for managing cybersecurity risks).
15. Webinar, Cybersecurity Whistleblowers: The Next Wave of SEC Whistleblowing, ORRICK,
HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.orrick.com/Events/2015/12/Cyber
security-Whistleblowers-The-Next-Wave-of-SEC-Whistleblowing.
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entities for failing to adequately respond to cybersecurity risks, 16 thereby
evidencing yet another way that the agency has significantly expanded its
enforcement powers in recent years—an area subject to active scholarly
debate.17
In addition to addressing these issues, this Article finds that the absence
of binding SEC cybersecurity regulations, which currently exist only in the
non-binding form of the 2011 Guidance, translate into a direct problem for
cybersecurity whistleblowers. Such persons are likely to be excluded from
the protections of Dodd-Frank and SOX because their disclosures would be
beyond the scope of protected activity enumerated under those statutes,
which only cover explicit violations of the federal securities laws, rules, or
regulations subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction.18
Part I of this Article focuses on the importance of effective information
gathering and internal reporting in ensuring that cybersecurity risks are
promptly detected and remediated, while also considering the role of
compliance officers and boards of directors in processing this information. In
creating this type of corporate culture, the critical role of cybersecurity
whistleblowers is addressed. Part II explains the weaknesses of
whistleblower protections under SOX and Dodd-Frank in light of the absence
of binding SEC cybersecurity regulations for reporting companies, which has
the likely effect of removing cybersecurity whistleblowers from the category
of those who are eligible for relief under the statutes. Part III discusses the
general prevalence of cybersecurity-related threats and data breaches in
recent years, evidencing that the reports of cybersecurity whistleblowers are
increasingly valuable and should be subject to ample protections under the
law. Finally, although cybersecurity threats appear to affect consumers more
than investors, and thus would seem to fall within the purview of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) as regulator rather than the SEC, this section hones
in on the shareholder effects of such threats as a means to justifying the SEC’s
stance as a major regulator in this arena.
16. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Morgan Stanley Failed to Safeguard
Customer Data (June 8, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-112.html; Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Investment Adviser With Failing to Adopt
Proper Cybersecurity Policies and Procedures Prior To Breach (Sept. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Press
Release, SEC Charges Investment Adviser], https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015202.html; Corey Bennett, SEC Goes After Investment Adviser for Poor Cybersecurity, THE HILL
(Sept. 22, 2015, 4:33 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/254554-sec-goes-after-invest
ment-firm-for-poor-cybersecurity.
17. See David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1163–71
(2016) (discussing the controversy surrounding the SEC’s recent expanded enforcement powers to
heavily pursue administrative, rather than judicial, adjudication); see Jed S. Rackoff, Practicing Law
Inst. Sec. Regulation Inst., Keynote Address Is the S.E.C. Becoming a Law Unto Itself? (Nov. 5,
2014), http://assets.law360news.com/0593000/593644/Sec.Reg.Inst.final.pdf (discussing this
“administrative creep” of the SEC and vast expansion of its enforcement powers in recent years).
18. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 116 Stat. 745; Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 94-29, §17, 89 Stat. 97 (1975)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)).
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I. WHISTLEBLOWING AND CYBERSECURITY COMPLIANCE
The financial scandals and crises of the twenty-first century have brought
the issue of compliance to heightened focus.19 Effective internal reporting
channels that facilitate the receipt of information pertaining to corporate
wrongdoing and a prompt management response are some of the most crucial
components of a successful compliance program.20 Cybersecurity has been
widely recognized as a compliance issue with important ramifications for the
general public, the management of which is shaped, to a large degree, by
corporate social responsibility principles, effective internal controls, and a
corporate culture that promotes the free flow of information.21 Since the
issuance of the 2011 Guidance, the SEC has consistently advised that
cybersecurity breaches and risks are most effectively handled through
compliance measures that include increased involvement of compliance
officers, periodic internal cybersecurity assessments, routine monitoring and
testing of information systems, improved knowledge and oversight by the
board of directors, and the implementation of employee policies to detect and
report cybersecurity threats.22 Whistleblowers are enormously beneficial in
many of these efforts. “Whistleblowers can be the canaries in the mine shaft,
providing early warning of imminent disaster.”23
19. See, e.g., James A. Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A Reorientation in Compliance for
Broker-Dealers, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1121, 1150 (2014) (discussing the growth of compliance
obligations as financial sector regulation has grown over the years, especially in light of scandals);
Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411,
442 (2007) (noting the importance of corporate compliance measures in the wake of the Enron
collapse and other corporate scandals).
20. See Cynthia Estlund, Corporate Self-Regulation and the Future of Workplace Governance,
84 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 617, 625–26 (2009) (discussing the key role that employees play in selfregulation to ensure compliance and the dangers of employer reprisals in this context).
21. See, e.g., Noah G. Susskind, Cybersecurity Compliance and Risk Management Strategies:
What Directors, Officers, and Managers Need to Know, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 573, 576 (2015)
(noting “mismanagement” as a contributor to cybersecurity problems); Lawrence J. Trautman &
Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s Responsibility for Information Technology Governance, 28
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 313, 315–16 (2011) (discussing the role of the board in
managing IT-related issues); Danielle Warner, From Bombs and Bullets to Botnets and Bytes: Cyber
War and The Need for A Federal Cybersecurity Agency, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 1, 22
(2012) (“[T]ougher regulation of critical infrastructure’s cybersecurity paired with a system of
auditing and accountability have the ability to greatly enhance the security of our nation and its
networks.”); Emmanuel Olaoye, Cybersecurity Should be a Compliance Issue, REUTERS (Aug. 27,
2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2013/08/27/cybersecurity-should-be-acompliance-issue-says-expert/.
22. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVISION INV. MGMT, CYBERSECURITY GUIDANCE (2015),
http://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2015-02.pdf; SEC Releases Cybersecurity Guidance,
Highlights Compliance Role, NAT’L L. REV. (May 1, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/
sec-releases-cybersecurity-guidance-highlights-compliance-role.
23. Constance E. Bagley, Mark Roellig & Gianmarco Massameno, Who Let the Lawyers Out?:
Reconstructing the Role of the Chief Legal Officer and the Corporate Client in a Globalizing World,
18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 419, 469 (2016) (citing CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY, MANAGERS AND THE LEGAL
ENVIRONMENT: STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 37 (8th ed. 2016) (“Like the birds taken into
mines to detect deadly gases, they often perceive dangers before top management.”)).
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Despite their contributions, whistleblowers have not traditionally been
viewed as key players in modern corporate governance—instead, they are
commonly labeled with pejorative titles like “snitch,” “rat,” or “traitor.”24
Although negative perceptions of whistleblowers have started to change in
recent years,25 whistleblowers still face an uphill battle and commonly
experience retaliation for their efforts, especially among the many
organizations that manifest a culture or environment of silence and ignore or
punish whistleblowers as dissenters to group consensus.26 There is extensive
research to reveal that most whistleblowers opt for internal reporting and will
only seek to externally report information when they have been ignored in
the past or when internal reporting channels are simply not available or
futile.27 As such, an organizational culture of encouraging and responding to
whistleblowers and internal reports is of fundamental importance to regulated
entities. Not only are internal controls and reporting channels mandated by
legislation like SOX,28 they serve as mitigating factors in the Department of
Justice’s decision regarding whether to criminally indict a corporation and in
sentencing decisions under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.29 There are
24. See, e.g., Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, False Claims, Not Securities Fraud: Towards
Corporate Governance by Whistleblowers, 15 NEXUS: CHAPMAN’S J.L. & POL’Y 55, 61 (2010);
Vega, supra note 3, at 491; see also Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the
Employment-at-Will Doctrine: A Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX.
L. REV. 543, 642 (2004) (each discussing common retaliatory reactions to whistleblowers).
25. Geneva Campbell, Snitch or Savior? How the Modern Cultural Acceptance of
Pharmaceutical Company Employee External Whistleblowing is Reflected in Dodd-Frank and the
Affordable Care Act, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 565, 573–75 (2013) (noting a recent increased sense of
accepting whistleblowers); Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 1151, 1159 (2010) (noting a shift in perceptions of whistleblowing to be viewed as “a heroic
act”).
26. See, e.g., James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate
Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 469 (2004) (discussing “organizational silence” in light of
groupthink and other social psychological research that reject any internal negative views of the
firm); see also Jamie Darin Prenkert, Julie Manning Magid & Allison Fetter-Harrott, Retaliatory
Disclosure: When Identifying the Complainant is an Adverse Action, 91 N.C. L. REV. 889, 933
(2013) (noting that the threat of reprisal to whistleblowers is often the most harsh “when it is
combined with the tyranny of the majority”).
27. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping
Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 463 (2009) (discussing “empirical research confirm[ing] that
whistleblowers indeed prefer internal speech to immediate outside reporting”); Elletta Sangrey
Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle to the Media, and Why:
Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 170–79 (1994)
(noting that employees are more likely to externally report when there has been no effective
response to their internal disclosure); MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE
WHISTLE THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES
511–15 (1992).
28. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012)); 7 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(a) (2016).
29. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2012); Memorandum from Mark R. Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components &
U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 3–4 (Aug. 28, 2008),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf.
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also countless organizational benefits to whistleblowing, including the
avoidance of negative press and litigation commonly associated with external
reporting, the ability to correct wrongdoing in a timely manner to decrease
potential overall harm, an improvement in overall work environment and
employee morale, and company commitment to an ethical culture.30
Internal whistleblowing in this context is especially beneficial to
reporting companies in that it may help gather the necessary information that
is required for compliance with the 2011 Guidance.31 The materiality
thresholds for such reporting requires information that would influence the
decision of a “reasonable investor” in this context—cybersecurity-related
problems are likely to negatively affect the company’s stock price, financial
posture, or carry other investor risks, and the whistleblower’s discovery and
reporting of such information, if substantiated, is likely to help companies
become aware of such information when it may otherwise remain
undetected.32
In promoting the goals of the 2011 Guidance, the SEC has consistently
called upon senior management, including corporate boards and officers, to
play a pronounced and “proactive” role in the detection and prevention of
cybersecurity threats by ensuring that the company has proper mechanisms
in place to catch such issues before any real threat occurs.33 In her opening
remarks at the 2014 Roundtable, SEC Chair White noted that while the SEC’s
formal jurisdiction over cybersecurity is “directly focused on the integrity of
our market systems, customer data protection, and disclosure of material
information,” every government agency must understand and assess the
cybersecurity risks relevant to its respective area of regulation.34
Cybersecurity experts speaking at the Roundtable noted the importance of
early detection of cyber threats, which allows companies to more quickly
30. See, e.g., Kevin Rubinstein, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806:
Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 637, 650 (2007–2008)
(noting that whistleblowing provides many benefits to organizations); Letter from Alexander M.
Cutler, Chair, Bus. Roundtable, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec.
17, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-142.pdf; Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al.,
Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance: Promoting Organizational
Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 195–96
(2002) (discussing the organizational benefits of internal whistleblowing); Orly Lobel, Linking
Prevention, Detection, and Whistleblowing: Principles for Designing Effective Reporting Systems,
54 S. TEX. L. REV. 37, 41–42 (2012) (“[A]ttempts to resolve compliance issues should first be made
internally.”).
31. Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing: What the Corporate
Governance Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley Mean for Employment Law, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y
J. 1, 31–33 (2007).
32. Id.; see also William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility
for Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 7 (2005) (discussing materiality standards); 17
C.F.R. § 229.601(b) (2016).
33. Ben DiPietro, The Morning Risk Report: Cybersecurity Responsibility Falling to Boards,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2015, 7:29 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/03/04/themorning-risk-report-cybersecurity-responsibility-falling-to-boards/.
34. White Statement, supra note 7.
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remediate issues before they escalate into more serious and alarming
degrees.35 Noting that cyber-threats cannot be completely avoided but must
instead be managed and mitigated, the discussants expressed that such
responsibilities cannot be “one person’s job” or the job solely of the “tech or
IT” employees; instead they called for a “multi-stakeholder effort” within
organizations involving the preparation and coordination of all constituents.36
Commentators noted that one of the most significant challenges is the
communication of cyber-risks to senior executives and boards of directors
and the need to create a “culture” within companies in which cybersecurity
issues “start[ ] at the keyboard . . . with every single employee,” who must
themselves be empowered to report any concerns when they are observed.37
To this end, commentators have emphasized the need for boards of directors
to ensure that there are clear reporting channels and compliance programs in
place for employees to “feel able to report data security issues” and an
effective system to investigate and record actions taken in response to
reported information.38
It is within this very context that cybersecurity whistleblowers play a key
role. Although the connection between the securities laws, cybersecurity, and
whistleblowing may not be immediately apparent, the contributions of the
latter are directly linked to raising red flags within the company pertaining to
cyber-related threats. Important areas of whistleblower disclosures in the
cybersecurity arena may include reporting on inadequate risk controls to
counter the effects of cyber-threats, the need for increased public company
disclosures relating to computer hacking or other cybersecurity-related
incidents, suspicious activity occurring among a company’s online systems,
and taking caution that cyber-related risks do not remain undetected for
extended periods of time.39
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Thad A. Davis, Michael Li-Ming Wong & Nicola M. Paterson, The Data Security
Governance Conundrum: Practical Solutions and Best Practices for the Boardroom and the CSuite, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 613, 651 (2015) (discussing the benefits of establishing a “culture
of data security compliance”); Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s Responsibility for
Director Selection and Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75, 113–15 (2012) (discussing the
role of corporate directors in overseeing cybersecurity and technology-related risks and issues);
Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee Financial Expert Under SEC
Regulations and NYSE Rules?, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 205, 233 (2013) (proposing that IT
experience and expertise should be considered in director recruitment to avoid expensive costs and
lawsuits related to cybersecurity issues).
39. See, e.g., Jordan Thomas & Vanessa De Simone, Cybersecurity - Growing Technological
Threats Raise New Issues for Investors and the SEC, SECWHISTLEBLOWERADVOCATE (May 1,
2014),
http://www.secwhistlebloweradvocate.com/secwhistlebloweradvocate/cybersecuritygrowing-technological-threats-raise-new-issues-for-investors-and-the-sec; Eric Young, An
Important Areas for Whistleblowers, MCELDREW YOUNG, http://www.mceldrewyoung.com/
whistleblower/sec/cybersecurity/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2016); Igor Volovich, Cyber Whistleblowing
Pivotal in Ensuring Corporate Transparency and Accountability in the IoT Era, PEERLYST (Sept.
25, 2015), https://www.peerlyst.com/posts/cyber-whistleblowing-pivotal-in-ensuring-corporate-
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Attorneys in the field have called upon SEC-regulated companies to “get
serious about protecting customer data” and to be “forthright about potential
risks” related to cyber-threats, while also expressing that the “lesson” for
would-be whistleblowers is not to assume that any wrongdoing that they
observe involving these issues would be outside the realm of the SEC’s
regulatory authority.40 Two attorneys skilled in retaliation law who have
spoken on the issue and have represented whistleblowers reporting in the
cybersecurity arena acknowledged that although none of the “highly public
‘mega breaches’” involving cybersecurity have involved a whistleblower,
“[i]t is only a matter of time . . . before we see a headline announcing that a
hacked company knew about its vulnerabilities yet did nothing to protect its
customers, but instead fired the whistleblower who identified and sought to
fix the problem.”41
There have been several recent examples of retaliation against
cybersecurity whistleblowers spanning across a wide range of industries,
including individuals who themselves work in the cybersecurity arena. In one
instance, Richard Wallace, a former investigator at the cybersecurity
company Tiversa, blew the whistle on his employer by alleging that the
company had invented false data breaches for the purpose of inducing clients
to buy the company’s cybersecurity services.42 In one particularly egregious
instance, Wallace revealed that Tiversa falsely informed LabMD, a cancer
testing company, that it had been hacked and then offered it emergency
“incident response” cybersecurity services.43 When LabMD refused, Tiversa
allegedly threatened to inform federal regulators about the company’s data
breach and ultimately informed the FTC of the incident, which brought
charges against LabMD, forcing the company to fight the charges in court,
ultimately lose, and close down its business.44
Another example involved an employee-whistleblower of the investment
company Vanguard, who claimed that the company’s password policy was
transparency-and-accountability-in-the-iot-era; Lance Hayden, What’s Your Cybersecurity
Whistleblower Strategy?, CSO (Jan. 5, 2016 5:31 AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/301885
3/leadership-management/whats-your-cybersecurity-whistleblower-strategy.html (offering the
example of an employee who reports vulnerabilities about the company’s infrastructure and the
increased interest of lawyers in such cases).
40. Thomas & De Simone, supra note 39; Young, supra note 39; see generally SEC Disclosure
and Corporate Governance, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.weil.
com/~/media/files/pdfs/pcag_sec_discl_alert_jan_2015.pdf.
41. Debra Katz & Alexis H. Ronickher, Ignoring Issues Raised by Cybersecurity Whistleblowers
Only Compounds the Problem, KATZ, MARSHALL & BANKS (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.kmblegal.
com/publications/ignoring-issues-raised-cybersecurity-whistleblowers-only-compounds-problem.
42. Jose Pagliery, Whistleblower Accuses Cybersecurity Company of Extorting Clients, CNN
MONEY (May 7, 2015, 2:32 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/07/technology/tiversa-labmd-ftc/;
Cale Guthrie Weissman, A Cybersecurity Firm is Being Accused of Extorting Clients, BUS. INSIDER
(May 7, 2015, 6:02 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/a-whistleblower-claims-that-cybersec
urity-firm-tiversa-fakes-hacks-to-get-companies-to-pay-for-services-2015-5.
43. See id.
44. See Pagliery, supra note 42.
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too weak to withstand susceptibility to cyber-attacks.45 This whistleblower
internally revealed that she and clients of the company were able to
successfully log into online accounts despite typographical errors in
providing security password answers.46 The whistleblower, a client
relationship manager, had received complaints from angry customers about
this problem and, for two years, flagged this issue to upper management as a
major cybersecurity concern for the company’s twenty million customers.
The manager also communicated an additional security issue pertaining to
the voice verification system.47 Her reports were futile—she never received
a formal response from management and was told “to stop complaining,”
which prompted her to file whistleblower tips directly with the SEC and the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which both investigated
her concerns.48 Subsequent to her revelations, she was fired for being in
“violation of Vanguard’s Professional Conduct Policy,”49 thus providing an
example of what appears to be a clear case of retaliation.
Other examples of whistleblowers reporting on cybersecurity-related
issues include a tip that led to charges by the Department of Health and
Human Services against a hospital for improperly storing protected health
information electronically,50 and a case of alleged retaliation against a
whistleblower who disclosed security violations at a U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs regional office that included unauthorized access and use of
data and information systems, the falsification of security reports, and the
sharing of passwords.51
Another related subset of whistleblowing involves cybersecurity
professionals, including information-security researchers or technicians, who
assess and expose vulnerabilities or flaws in the information systems of
companies and act as “fact-checkers” of information technology.52 These
professionals commonly act as cybersecurity consultants and many are hired
by public companies and government agencies to ensure the safety of internal

45. Clayton Browne, Does Low-Cost Vanguard Have Low-Cost (& Quality) Cyber Security?,
VALUEWALK (Aug. 11, 2015, 10:11 AM), http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/08/vanguard-cybersecurity/; Susan Antilla, Is Vanguard Making It Too Easy for Cybercriminals to Access Your
Account?, THESTREET (Aug. 10, 2015, 12:27 PM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/13213265/1/isvanguard-making-it-too-easy-for-cybercriminals-to-access-your-account.html.
46. See Browne, supra note 45.
47. Antilla, supra note 45.
48. Id.
49. Susan Antilla, Vanguard Group Fires Whistleblower Who Told TheStreet About Flaws in
Customer Security, THESTREET (Sept. 18, 2015, 12:20 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13293
245/1/vanguard-group-fires-whistleblower-who-told-thestreet-about-flaws-in-customersecurity.html.
50. Mark Mermelstein, The Rise of the Cybersecurity Whistleblower, ORRICK (Oct. 1, 2015),
https://www.orrick.com/Insights/2015/10/The-Rise-of-the-Cybersecurity-Whistleblower.
51. Daniels v. Dep’t. of Veteran Affairs, 276 F. App’x 1002, 1002–04 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
52. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hacking Speech: Informational Speech and the First Amendment,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 795, 821 (2013).
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information systems.53 Otherwise known as “white hat hackers” or “ethical
hackers,” such persons are employed to find security holes with the
permission of the owner, without exploiting them, which is conducted
through mechanisms such as penetration testing, vulnerability assessments,
and the testing of in-place security systems.54 One famous example of a
“white hat hacker” attempting to help a company address a security problem
is Michael Lynn, an experienced security researcher for the firm Internet
Security Systems Inc., who followed protocol by probing for flaws in
computer hardware and software with the intent of discovering security
issues.55 Lynn discovered one such flaw at Cisco Systems Inc.—a way to
crack open the company’s operating system on its internet routers, which
posed a huge infrastructure risk.56 After Lynn reported the problem to Cisco,
the company issued a patch to correct it, but, concerned about “damaging the
invincible image of its products,” it refused to alert customers to the problem,
thereby placing their personal information at risk.57 Lynn, concerned about
the lack of public disclosure of this problem, prepared a presentation for the
Black Hat hacker conference in Las Vegas that would describe the details of
the particular bug.58 Cisco fiercely objected, citing violations of intellectual
property law, and obtained a restraining order preventing Lynn from
presenting his information.59 Lynn gave his presentation regardless and, at
least as of 2012, was employed by a competitor of Cisco as a senior
engineer.60
Depending on their employment situation, cybersecurity researchers like
Lynn have increasingly identified themselves as whistleblowers for being in
possession of valuable information that is not likely to be discovered by
anyone else.61 When the owner of the system fails to take action to address
or remedy the security issue, cybersecurity researchers are often viewed as
whistleblowers for “alerting the world to unsafe business practices,”
“breaking important news on topics of public interest,” and “engaging in
scientific or academic commentary.”62 The revelation of such information,
53. Nadia Kovacs, What is the Difference Between Black, White, and Grey Hat Hackers?,
SYMANTEC NORTON CMTY (Aug. 11, 2015, 8:50 AM), http://community.norton.com/en/blogs/
norton-protection-blog/what-difference-between-black-white-and-grey-hat-hackers.
54. Id.
55. Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1053–54
(2011).
56. Id. at 1053.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (Cisco also “forced conference organizers to rip the printed version of Lynn’s slides out
of the conference materials, and to turn over CDs containing a copy of his slideshow.”).
60. Jordan Robertson, Famous Hackers: Then and Now, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/slideshow/2012-04-18/famous-hackers-then-and-now.html#slide7.
61. Matwyshyn, supra note 52, at 829. The scarcity of the information that these types of
whistleblowers possess is precisely what makes it so valuable. See also id. at 822 n.133 (noting that
a “metaphor for information security researchers might be one of whistleblowers”).
62. Id. at 829.
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due to its sensitive and proprietary nature, which may also include trade
secrets, is likely to expose whistleblowers not only to retaliation at work, but
also to a risk of criminal prosecution or civil suits.63
II. PROTECTING CYBERSECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS
A. THE ABSENCE OF RETALIATION PROTECTIONS FOR
CYBERSECURITY WHISTLEBLOWERS
Information is key to mitigating the effects of cybersecurity breaches and
whistleblowers stand to play a crucial role in discovering and reporting
information to effectively manage the problem. As discussed, despite recent
trends in society viewing whistleblowers in a more positive light,64 they still
commonly experience negative reactions for the information they have
brought forward.65 Reactions to cybersecurity whistleblowers have been no
different.66 It is believed that the reason cybersecurity whistleblowers face
employer resistance is due to senior management’s immense difficulty
handling cybersecurity vulnerabilities and the constant evolution of such
threats.67 For example, executives who are accustomed to long-standing
cybersecurity systems may not wish to consider or address the new
challenges that the whistleblower has reported and may feel that the costs of
doing so are too great in the interim and may compromise current business
practices or opportunities.68 As noted previously, employer concerns may
also center on the repercussions for exposed intellectual property or other
trade secrets. However, ignoring cybersecurity whistleblowers is detrimental
to employers and regulated entities, especially in light of the 2011 Guidance’s
requirements.
The 2011 Guidance was prompted by a letter to former SEC Chair Mary
Schapiro from former Senator John D. Rockefeller and four other members
of Congress urging the SEC, in light of the several recent cyber-attacks on
well-known public companies, to develop guidelines explaining a company’s
duty to publicly disclose information in this arena.69 The SEC’s Division of

63. See id.
64. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 25, at 1159 (describing a shift in perception of

whistleblowers).
65. See generally ETHIC RES. CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY OF THE U.S.
WORKFORCE 13 (2013), https://www.ibe.org.uk/userassets/surveys/nbes2013.pdf (describing
retaliation as a widespread problem); see generally Stephen Kohn, Retaliation against
Whistleblowers at All-Time High,” WHISTLEBLOWERS LEGAL PROTECTION BLOG (Dec. 10, 2014),
http://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2014/12/articles/false-claims/retaliation-against-whistleblow
ers-at-all-time-high/.
66. See Katz & Ronickher, supra note 41; see supra Part I.
67. See Katz & Ronickher, supra note 41.
68. See id.
69. See Letter from John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm’n on Commerce, Sci.
& Transp. et al., to Mary Schapiro, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 11, 2011);
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Corporate Finance then issued the 2011 Guidance in light of the market’s
“increasing dependence” on technology.70 In this vein, the 2011 Guidance
attempts to alert public companies to the various disclosure obligations that
are already in existence under SEC regulations that, although do not
“explicitly refer[ ] to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents,” would prompt
reporting companies to “discuss” such concerns in their public filings as
material information for investors.71 The SEC focused on existing reporting
requirements that “may impose an obligation” on registrants to also disclose
cybersecurity information.72 These existing requirements are mostly codified
in various items of Regulation S-K, which prompt ongoing disclosures under
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act) for public company issuers of securities, registrants, and
filers.73 Specifically, the SEC invoked the following items of Regulation SK as being relevant to the disclosure of cybersecurity risks: Items 101
(Description of Business), 103 (Legal Proceedings), 303 (Management’s
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations
(MD&A), 307 (Disclosure Controls and Procedures), and 503 (Risk
Factors).74
One of the most significant problems with the 2011 Guidance is that it
lacks the force of law of a binding SEC regulation. The non-binding nature
of the 2011 Guidance is explicit in that it begins with the qualification that
“[t]his guidance is not a rule, regulation, or statement of the Securities and
Exchange Commission” and “the Commission has neither approved nor
disapproved its content.”75 As such, a gray area has emerged with respect to
whether cybersecurity whistleblowers are eligible for the robust retaliation
protections under the federal securities laws, specifically under the
whistleblower programs of SOX and Dodd-Frank. Under Section 806 of
SOX, which was enacted in 2002, employees of publicly-traded companies
blowing the whistle on reasonably believed violations of the federal securities
laws are protected from retaliation if they report such information either i)
internally to someone with supervisory authority over them or ii) externally
to a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency or member or committee
of Congress.76 To exercise this right, an aggrieved whistleblower must
undergo the administrative remedy of filing a complaint before the Secretary
of Labor within 180 days of the alleged retaliation, and, if substantiated, may
Norah C. Avellan, The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Growing Need for
Cybersecurity in Modern Corporate America, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 193, 206–07 (2014).
70. See CF-2 Disclosure Guidance, supra note 8, at 2.
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id.
73. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101–.702 (2016).
74. See id.; see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101, 229.103, 229.303, 229.307, 229.503(c).
75. See CF-2 Disclosure Guidance, supra note 8, at supplementary information.
76. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2012)).
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obtain compensatory damages consisting of reinstatement of employment,
back pay with interest, and litigation and attorneys’ fees.77 As discussed, in
2010, Congress enacted Dodd-Frank, which established a solid
whistleblower program providing stronger retaliation protections than SOX
and a generous bounty reward program to incentivize whistleblowing.78
Although the statutory language of the SOX and Dodd-Frank programs
is not identical, both statutes protect whistleblowers who provide information
that they reasonably believe involves possible violations of the federal
securities laws, rules, or regulations under the SEC’s jurisdiction.79 SOX
protects whistleblower disclosures reasonably believed to “constitute[] a
violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law
relating to fraud against shareholders” when the whistleblower reports such
information either externally or internally.80 The protected activity
enumerated in the language of SOX sections 1341, 1343, 1344, and 1348
consists of mail fraud, wire fraud, banking fraud, and securities fraud,
respectively.81 Similarly, Dodd-Frank, which protects whistleblowers from
retaliation, regardless of whether they are eligible for a bounty award,82
includes the following categories as protected activity under subsection (h)
thereof: i) providing information to the SEC; ii) initiating, testifying, or
assisting in any investigation, judicial, or administrative action of the SEC;
or iii) making disclosures “that are required or protected under [SOX, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (retaliating against a
witness, victim, or informant)] and any other law, rule, or regulation subject
to the jurisdiction of the [SEC].”83

77. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(b), 1514A(c). If the Secretary of Labor has not issued a final decision
within 180 days of the filing of the complaint and there is no evidence that the delay is due to bad
faith of the whistleblower, then the whistleblower may bring an action in federal district court. Id.
78. Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 94-29, §17, 89 Stat. 97, (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(b) (2012)); see also Geoffrey C. Rapp, Four Signal Moments in Whistleblower Law: 19832013, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389, 400 (2013) (discussing the incentives that Dodd-Frank
creates for whistleblowers).
79. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (2016).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (emphasis added).
81. Id. (as set forth above, the language of SOX references the various statutory citations of
these types of fraud, which, for i, ii, iii, and iv. listed above are 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, or
1348, respectively).
82. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2. To be eligible for a bounty award, whistleblowers must ensure
that they provide “original information” leading to a successful SEC enforcement action resulting
in monetary sanctions of at least $1,000,000. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-6(a), 78u-6 (b).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (emphasis added). There is a current division in the courts as to
whether, under Dodd-Frank, a whistleblower who reports only internally and not externally to the
SEC or another federal agency, is eligible for retaliation protection under the statute due to the
definition of whistleblower in the statute as individuals who “provide information . . . to the [SEC].”
Id. § 78u-6(a)(6); see generally Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Program’s Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721 (2014)
(discussing the division of courts in this arena).
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Against this backdrop, it is likely that whistleblower disclosures relating
to an employer’s perceived violations of the SEC’s 2011 Guidance are not
included among the various types of protected activity captured by the two
statutes; as such, violating the 2011 Guidance would neither constitute a
violation of the laws enumerated within SOX or Dodd-Frank nor a dulyauthorized SEC law, rule, or regulation. Thus, employees who are
contemplating blowing the whistle in this arena cannot be assured that they
are protected in the event of reprisal for their reporting. As discussed earlier,
management’s response to a cybersecurity whistleblower may not be
positive, as revelation of cybersecurity vulnerabilities will often result in
higher costs for the entity, an unwillingness to alter long-standing
cybersecurity systems, concern over compromised intellectual property, or a
lack of understanding as to the complexity of the issues.84
Specificically relating to retaliation protections under SOX, empirical
studies have revealed that when whistleblowers are unsuccessful in obtaining
relief under the statute, one of the most common reasons is due to a failure to
categorize the whistleblower’s disclosure as “protected activity” as defined.85
Such studies have revealed that in cases in which OSHA and Administrative
Law Judges (ALJs) (on appeal) have decided in favor of employers, the
reason has been due to whistleblowers reporting on information in “other”
fraud categories, general fraud, or accounting irregularities that did not fit
squarely within one of the six clearly enumerated categories of protection
under SOX.86 As such, OSHA and ALJs have conveyed a narrow
interpretation of what constitutes protected activity under the statute that
requires the whistleblower to directly link his or her disclosure to specific
instances of shareholder fraud.87 In the same vein, cybersecurity
whistleblowers that report concerns are likely to find that their disclosures do
not fall within the enumerated categories eligible for retaliation protections.
Similarly, under Dodd-Frank, the definition of “whistleblower”
mandates that the individual provide “information relating to a violation of
the securities laws to the [SEC], in a manner established, by rule or
regulation, by the [SEC].”88 Beyond the face of the statute itself, the SEC
regulations interpreting Dodd-Frank, as well as federal courts that have
examined the issue, have all made clear that a whistleblower must report on
84. See infra Part IIB.
85. See Richard Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-

Oxley’s Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 113–15 (2007) (conducting an
empirical study revealing the lack of success of whistleblowers under SOX); Richard Moberly,
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 10 (2012)
(discussing the continued lack of success years later); see generally Beverley H. Earle & Gerald A.
Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection Under Sarbanes-Oxley: A Proposal for Change,
44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2007) (discussing the shortcomings of the SOX whistleblower program).
86. Moberly, supra note 85, at 116–18 (explaining the various hurdles that whistleblowers have
faced in claiming that they engaged in “protected activity”).
87. See id.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added).
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an explicit violation of the federal securities laws to be protected from
retaliation.89 The SEC regulations implementing Dodd-Frank state that the
statutory definition of “‘whistleblower’ clarifies that the [whistleblower]
submission must relate to a violation of the Federal securities laws, or a rule
or regulation promulgated by the [SEC],” thus specifically excluding
retaliation protections for whistleblowers who report on a state or foreign law
violation.90 The term “securities laws” also very clearly includes only the
following statutes: the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.91
Given the takeaways of the 2014 Roundtable calling for all employees to
be actively involved in reporting cyber-related concerns, the need to protect
whistleblowers in this arena is crucial. The transformation of the 2011
Guidance into binding SEC regulations as they relate to cybersecurity would
solicit feedback from important players in the industry through an official
notice and comment rulemaking period, create stronger incentives for
companies to adhere to the reporting requirements, and justify the SEC’s
imposition of sanctions or threatened enforcement actions.92 Such an action
would also have the effect of including cybersecurity-related disclosures as a
clear and enumerated category of protected whistleblower activity under both
SOX and Dodd-Frank.
B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
Judicial decisions interpreting the extent to which whistleblowers are
protected under the federal securities laws do not guarantee retaliation
protections for cybersecurity whistleblowers. Since SOX provides only an
administrative remedy for retaliation, the federal cases shedding light in this
area have all interpreted Dodd-Frank. Many such cases have emphasized that
89. See id. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,300
(June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249); Caroline E. Keen, Clarifying What Is “Clear”:
Reconsidering Whistleblower Protections Under Dodd-Frank, 19 N.C. BANKING INST. 215, 219
n.43 (2015).
90. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,302–03 (emphasis
added).
91. Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat 97 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
78c (2012)) (as stated in Section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
92. See, e.g., Matthew Ferraro, “Groundbreaking or Broken?” An Analysis of SEC
Cybersecurity Disclosure Guidance, its Effectiveness, and Implications, 77 ALB. L. REV. 297, 340–
41 (2014) (proposing that a note and comment period prior to the issuance of binding SEC
cybersecurity regulations would “promote fact-finding that could inform the policy” and “promote
acceptability” among entities subject to the regulations); Sam Young, Contemplating Corporate
Disclosure Obligations Arising from Cybersecurity Breaches, 38 J. CORP. L. 659, 676–77 (2013)
(noting that adoption of binding, formal rules would create affirmative legal obligations for
regulated companies); Avellan, supra note 69, at 222–24 (noting that various benefits that regulated
entities would derive from binding regulations).
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whistleblowers seeking protection under Dodd-Frank must have reported on
an “explicit” violation of the federal securities laws.93 In the absence of
establishing this type of reporting, whistleblower-plaintiffs have often not
been successful in moving past the motion to dismiss stage.
One of the most illustrative cases to date as to how a cybersecurity
whistleblower is likely to fare is the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York’s decision in Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc.94 In this case,
whistleblower Patrick Egan internally reported that the CEO of the company
for which he worked, TradingScreen, Inc., was diverting the company’s
corporate assets to another competitor company that the CEO solely owned.95
Egan was later fired for his allegations and sought relief under Dodd-Frank
for retaliation, to which the company and CEO responded with a motion to
dismiss.96 One of the most telling aspects of this case is the court’s
consideration of Egan’s argument that he disclosed the CEO’s alleged
violations of rules promulgated by FINRA, which would arguably fall under
Dodd-Frank’s protection of disclosures “subject to the jurisdiction of the
[SEC].”97 Egan alleged that the CEO had violated FINRA Rule 2010 by
misappropriating confidential client information of the company and FINRA
Rule 3270 by failing to report his position at the competitor company to
TradingScreen Inc.’s board of directors.98
The court was clear in rejecting this argument on the basis that DoddFrank does not protect whistleblower disclosures that reveal violations of just
“any” laws or regulations subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction, but rather protects
only “disclosures that are required or protected under . . . any other law, rule,
or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the [SEC].”99 In this case, the
FINRA rules in question did not impose an explicit “duty to disclose,” as
Rule 2010 contains only a “general obligation to ‘observe high standards of
commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade,’” while Rule
3270 imposes a duty to disclose on employees of FINRA member firms who
receive compensation from business activities outside the scope of their
relationship with the member firm, thus not being applicable to the CEO of

93. See, e.g., Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 2013) (noting that “the
plain language” of Dodd-Frank “mandates that in order to qualify as a whistleblower, one must
provide information to the SEC regarding an alleged federal securities law violation.”); Wagner v.
Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *7–8 (D. Colo. July 19, 2013),
aff’d, 571 F. App’x 698 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding that a whistleblower’s report was not protected
under the statute); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (M.D. Tenn.
2012).
94. Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
May 4, 2011).
95. Id. at *2.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *6–7 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2012)).
98. Id. at *6 (citing FINRA MANUAL RULES 2010, 3270).
99. Id. (emphasis added).
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TradingScreen, Inc.100 The court went on to state that “[m]erely alleging the
violation of a law or rule under the SEC’s purview is not enough; a plaintiff
must allege that a law or rule in the SEC’s jurisdiction explicitly requires or
protects disclosure of that violation.”101 In this way, the court declared that
Dodd-Frank does not protect whistleblowers who report violations of SEC
laws or regulations that do not impose a duty to disclose, thus barring Egan
from relief. This case takes the law one step further by requiring
whistleblowers to report on violations involving mandatory duties to
disclose, rather than simply general violations of the law. Subsequent cases
have relied on Egan and have adopted this same reasoning.102
Based on this logic, the non-binding nature of the 2011 Guidance makes
it unlikely that a whistleblower could claim that it mandates an explicit duty
to disclose. Rather than invoking a clear duty to disclose cybersecurity
information, the 2011 Guidance states that its goal is to “provide guidance
that assists registrants in assessing what, if any, disclosures should be
provided about cybersecurity matters in light of each registrant’s specific
facts and circumstances.”103 The 2011 Guidance makes specific reference to
the fact that, although “no existing disclosure requirement explicitly refers to
cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents,” reporting companies should be
mindful of whether their current disclosures relating to cybersecurity are
adequate in light of the federal securities laws.104 This language leaves much
discretion to a reporting company to decide whether a cybersecurity report is
warranted based on the materiality threshold. Given the discretionary
decisions that must be made before it is determined whether such a disclosure
is necessary, cybersecurity whistleblowers are likely to face obstacles in
relying solely on believed violations of the 2011 Guidance as support for their
retaliation protections under Dodd-Frank.
Additional cases interpreting Dodd-Frank have been similarly restrictive.
In 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee held that
the retaliation protections of Dodd-Frank “extend only to any ‘law, rule, or
regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,’” thus only
protecting employees from retaliation “if the federal violation falls within the
SEC’s jurisdiction.”105 In Nollner v. Southern Baptist Convention, Inc., two
100. Id. (internal citations omitted).
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. See Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (M.D. Tenn. 2012)

(“[A]nti-retaliation provision part (iii) only protects disclosures that are ‘required or protected’ by
laws, rules, or regulations within the SEC’s jurisdiction. Thus, an employee is not protected from
retaliation if the disclosure at issue—even if relates to an actual legal violation by the employer—
concerns a disclosure that is not ‘required’ or otherwise ‘protected’ by a law, rule, regulation within
the SEC’s jurisdiction.”); Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, No. 4:12-345, 2012 WL 2522599, at
*6 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2012), aff’d, 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013) (relying on Egan for the same
interpretation).
103. CF-2 Disclosure Guidance, supra note 8 (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. Nollner, 852 F. Supp 2d at 994.
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individuals who had blown the whistle on suspected violations of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) were not eligible for retaliation protection
under Dodd-Frank because their disclosures did not fall within the
jurisdiction of the SEC.106 The court explained that the FCPA violations
apply only to “issuers” of securities (defined as companies registered under
the Exchange Act or required to file reports with the SEC thereunder) and
“domestic concerns” (defined as citizens, nationals, or residents of the United
States).107 The court went on to explain that the SEC has jurisdiction only
over FCPA violations by “issuers,” while the Department of Justice has
jurisdiction over domestic concerns and other non-issuers who commit FCPA
violations.108 Because the defendants in this case were domestic concerns and
not issuers, the court straightforwardly found that the disclosures would not
constitute “protected activity” under Dodd-Frank, thereby barring the
whistleblowers from moving forward with their case to seek relief.109
In a case before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, Nicholas Zillges, the president and CEO of a bank, blew the
whistle to the bank’s board of directors, the FTC, and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) on conduct that he had observed violating the
federal banking laws.110 After being terminated for these reports, Zillges sued
his former employer for retaliation under Dodd-Frank. He was denied relief
after the court determined that Zillges did not meet the statutory definition of
“whistleblower,” because his disclosure did not relate to a “violation of the
securities laws.”111 Zillges argued that his disclosure fell within the third
category of protected activity under the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program,
subsection (h), which protects “disclosures that are required or protected
under [SOX] . . . including . . . section 1513 (e) of title 18.”112 Section 1513(e)
of Title 18 criminalizes interference with a person’s employment when such
person provides information to a law enforcement officer about the
commission or possible commission of a federal offense.113 Zillges alleged
that he was retaliated against under Section 1513(e) for making a disclosure
to law enforcement officers of the FTC and FDIC about the defendant’s
possible violation of certain banking laws.114 The court reasoned that because
the banking laws that Zillges reported on are not “securities laws,” which are
specifically defined to include only the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Investment
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id. at 996 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a) (2012)).
Id.
Id.
Zillges v. Kenney Bank & Tr., 24 F. Supp. 3d 795, 797 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
Id. at 801.
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
Zillges, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 801; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii); Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2012)).
114. See Zillges, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 801.
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Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and the
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970,115 Zillges could not avail himself
of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections and was excluded from
retaliation protection under the statute.
Since the 2011 Guidance cannot be described as an SEC rule, law, or
regulation that is specifically subject to the agency’s jurisdiction, employers
are likely to be successful on their motions to dismiss against cybersecurity
whistleblowers who sue them for retaliation. Until the SEC promulgates
actual regulations in this arena, cybersecurity whistleblowers are likely to
face an uphill battle in arguing that they should be subject to retaliation
protections under the federal securities laws. Importantly, given that
retaliation protections are not guaranteed, cybersecurity whistleblowers are
likely to be dissuaded from making reports in the first instance, which would
have a negative overall effect on building the type of corporate culture and
free-flowing information channels that are necessary to effectively manage
cybersecurity threats.
The risk for companies that ignore or silence cybersecurity
whistleblowers is that such individuals, perceiving that their employers do
not value their reports, will likely opt to externally report to the SEC,
especially in light of the bounty incentives that are available for
whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank.116 The Dodd-Frank whistleblower bounty
program is notable in that the SEC is obligated to pay whistleblowers
between 10% and 30% of the total monetary sanctions collected in a
successful enforcement of a covered judicial or administrative action, or
related action.117 “Covered judicial or administrative action” is defined as any
“judicial or administrative action brought by the [SEC] under the securities
laws that results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000,000.”118 In
determining the appropriate percentage of the bounty award, the SEC will
consider factors such as the significance of the whistleblower’s tip to the
success of the action and the degree of assistance the whistleblower has
offered.119
Whistleblowers are eligible for bounties even if they are not ultimately
successful on a retaliation claim.120 The goal of Dodd-Frank’s bounty
program is to offset the costs that whistleblowers usually suffer for their
reports, given the lasting effect of retaliation on their careers and
livelihoods.121 To date, the Dodd-Frank bounty program has been
enormously successful, resulting in millions of dollars in total payouts to
115. Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
78c (2012)).
116. Katz & Ronickher, supra note 41; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-6(b), 78u-6(c).
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b).
118. See id. § 78u-6(a).
119. Id.
120. See id. § 78u-6(b).
121. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111 (2010).
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numerous whistleblowers who have provided the SEC with successful tips.122
This program is further evidence of the SEC’s increasing reliance on
whistleblower tips to effectively govern the securities markets—a regulatory
goal that the agency feels must respond to the “global threat” of
cybersecurity.123
III. SEC INVOLVEMENT IN CYBERSECURITY
A. SHAREHOLDER IMPACT AND THE SEC
Instances of cyber-attacks or data breaches seem to appear in the news
on a near daily basis, posing a serious threat to both consumers and
shareholders. One of the most notable breaches in recent years involved
Target Corporation, where hackers stole credit and debit card information
from forty million of the store’s customers in 2013. It was not until a year
later that the full effects of this breach were known, when the retailer revealed
that additional personal information, including email and mailing addresses,
had been stolen from between seventy and one hundred million people.124
The financial effects of this particular breach were tremendous, as the
company’s gross total costs are believed to have reached $191 million,125
prompting the need for more than a hundred million customers to obtain new
cards and closely monitor against fraud and identity theft.126 In 2014, similar
data breaches resulting in financial losses occurred at several other wellknown companies, including Neiman Marcus, Michael’s craft chain, P.F.
Chang’s Bistro, UPS, Dairy Queen, Home Depot, Staples, and Sony.127 The
year 2015 was no different—by mid-year, there had been an increase of about
122. Press Release, SEC Issues $17 Million Whistleblower Award (June 9, 2016), https://www.
sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-114.html.
123. See White Statement, supra note 7 (noting that cyber threats “are of extraordinary and longterm seriousness” and “pose non-discriminating risks” to the financial markets). Interestingly, some
companies have provided their own types of bounties, through “bug bounty programs” to pay
“[white hat and ethical] hackers” to make the discovery of security flaws even more likely so that
companies can properly manage such risks. See, e.g., Susskind, supra note 21, at 629–33; Cassandra
Kirsch, The Grey Hat Hacker: Reconciling Cyberspace Reality and the Law, 41 N. KY. L. REV.
383, 397 (2014); Douglas A. Barnes, Deworming the Internet, 83 TEX. L. REV. 279, 323 (2004).
Such practices are not dissimilar to statutory whistleblower bounty programs that have recognized
the necessity of whistleblowers and the value they provide in reporting otherwise unknown
information to protect the public interest. See Susskind, supra note 21, at 633 (noting that “[t]he
reason we already reward whistleblowers, confidential informants, and witnesses—despite moral
squeamishness—is necessity”).
124. Hiroko Tabuchi, $10 Million Settlement in Target Data Breach Gets Preliminary Approval,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/20/business/target-settlement-ondata-breach.html?_r=0.
125. Brian Prince, Target Data Breach Tally Hits $162 Million in Net Costs, SECURITY WEEK
(Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.securityweek.com/target-data-breach-tally-hits-162-million-net-costs
(noting that this amount was partially offset by an insurance receivable in 2014 of $46 million).
126. Susskind, supra note 21, at 576.
127. Bill Hardekopf, The Big Data Breaches of 2014, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2015, 7:06 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ moneybuilder/2015/01/13/the-big-data-breaches-of-2014/.
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85% in the number of breaches in the banking and financial arenas compared
to the prior year, and significant data breaches among the following sectors:
Business (40.3%), Medical/Healthcare (35%), Banking/Credit/Financial
(10%), Educational (7.7%), and Government/Military (7.3%).128 Similar
threats are expected to be even higher by 2016’s end, as cyber-attacks are
continually on the rise.129
Why are these breaches so prevalent? They are directly correlated with
societal advances in technology—as businesses and entities electronically
collect, store, and transfer information about their business and compliance
operations, customers, employees, and other related data, they are inevitably
subject to technology’s dark side of compromised privacy.130 In today’s
digital age, unlike the times when data was physically stored in paper files,
internal storage of electronic data and computer memories are constantly
subject to system glitches, confusing technical requirements, and access by
unauthorized persons that may lead to stolen intellectual property, with
amplified risks when vendors or third parties manage information systems.131
The costs of these vulnerabilities are so vast that they are difficult to
quantify. Various sources and surveys have attempted to provide estimates
on the total aggregate costs stemming from cyber-breaches and attacks but
such results vary depending on the study. One 2015 study examining 350
companies across eleven countries revealed that the average total cost of a
data breach had increased by 23% over the prior two years to an estimated
$3.79 million.132 Some of the most common expenses associated with a
breach include increased executive involvement in an organization’s IT
response and the purchase of insurance to mitigate the overall costs of a

128. Roy Urrico, The 10 Worst Data Breaches of 2015 (So Far), CREDIT UNION TIMES (July 7,
2015), http://www.cutimes.com/2015/07/07/the-10-worst-data-breaches-of-2015-so-far/.
129. See Warren Gorham & Lamont, ISACA Identifies Five Cyber Risk Trends for 2016, BUS.
WIRE (Dec. 16, 2015, 10:33 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20151216005814/en/;
see also Harriet Taylor, Biggest Cybersecurity Threats in 2016, CNBC (Dec. 28 2015, 1:17 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/28/biggest-cybersecurity-threats-in-2016.html.
130. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce and Electronic Payment System Risks:
Lessons from PayPal, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 24–37 (forthcoming 2016) (discussing the
susceptibility of businesses engaged in e-commerce to cybersecurity risks); Lisa R. Lifshitz, Roland
Hung & Evan Atwood, The Canadian Approach to Data Breach Notification, 66 CONSUMER FIN.
L. Q. REP. 317, 318 (2012) (discussing that vast amounts of information in large databases increases
risks of unauthorized access); MILLER, supra note 2, at 387–90 (“Accompanying the growth of data
storage and communications . . . has been an ever-growing series of threats.”).
131. See David Orozco, The Knowledge Police, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 417, 424 (2014)
(“Technological advancements . . . allow parties to infringe on IP rights at a relatively low cost.”);
see also MILLER, supra note 2, at 388–90 (discussing increased reliance on technology as
contributing to compromised data).
132. Larry Poneman, Cost of Data Breaches Rising Globally, Says ‘2015 Cost of a Data Breach
Study: Global Analysis’, SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (May 27, 2015), https://securityintelligence.
com/cost-of-a-data-breach-2015/#.Vc4PI1y4mT8. The eleven countries included the United States,
United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, France, Brazil, Japan, Italy, India, the Arabian region (United
Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia), and Canada. Id.
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breach for persons affected.133 Other associated costs include decreases in
stock value, disruptions in regular business activities, stolen intellectual
property, litigation and shareholder derivative lawsuits, and goodwill and
reputational costs, all of which reached a high of one trillion dollars dating
back to 2008 and are only expected to rise in future years.134 A 2010
Symantec study that considered the costs associated with the different
variables related to cyber-attacks found an average cost of $2.8 million for
large businesses and $2 million annually for all businesses, while a McAfee
report found that the average cost per firm was approximately $1.2 million in
2010.135 Despite attempts to quantify the costs of cyber-breaches, the true
cost for the private sector remains unknown due to the fact that many cyberattacks are often “unnoticed, unattributed, or at the very least
underappreciated.”136 The recent Cybersecurity Act, which became law in
December of 2015, attempts to rectify the hesitation of entities to volunteer
information out of fear of liability or future cyber-attacks by implementing a
framework for private companies to safely share information about
cybersecurity threats with other entities and the federal government.137
Given the difficulty in determining just how far-reaching the costs of
cyber-breaches and attacks may be, it is not surprising that a wide variety of
regulatory and legislative efforts have increasingly sought to enforce data
security safeguards by calling upon entities to publicly disclose their
cybersecurity threats.138 Several regulatory investigations into cyber133. Id.
134. Susskind, supra note 21, at 575 (citing THE WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW:

ASSURING A TRUSTED AND RESILIENT INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE
(2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf); see
also David Z. Bodenheimer & Gordon Griffin, Pillaging the Digital Treasure Troves the
Technology, Economics, and Law of Cyber Espionage, ABA SCITECH L., Winter 2014, at 16, 20;
MILLER, supra note 2, at 400 (noting that class action attorneys “on the lookout for new cases” may
be likely to file cybersecurity-related claims against companies “on behalf of thousands or millions
of plaintiffs.”).
135. Scott J. Shackelford, Timothy Fort & Jamie D. Prenkert, How Businesses Can Promote
Cyber Peace, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 353, 371 (2014) (citing SYMANTEC, STATE OF ENTERPRISE
SECURITY 9 (2010), https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/presskits/SES_report_Feb
2010.pdf); MCAFFE & SCI. APPLICATIONS INT’L CORP., UNDERGROUND ECONOMIES:
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL AND SENSITIVE CORPORATE DATA NOW THE LATEST CYBERCRIME
CURRENCY 3, 7 (2011), http://www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/Cyber/Documents/rp-undergrou
nd-economies.pdf).
136. Shackelford, Fort & Prenkert, supra note 135, at 371–72 (discussing the various reasons
why such numbers are hard to pinpoint).
137. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014, S. 2588, 113th Cong. (2014); Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015); see Scott J. Shackelford & Scott
Russell, Operationalizing Cybersecurity Due Diligence: A Transatlantic Comparative Case Study
11 (Ind. Univ. Kelley Sch. of Bus. Research Paper No. 16-16, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714529 (discussing the provisions of the new Act).
138. See Scott J. Shackelford et. al., Toward A Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?:
Exploring the Implications of the 2014 Nist Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping Reasonable
National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 305, 322 (2015) (discussing
the efforts of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission
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breaches have already occurred and regulators have stated that they will hold
boards of directors, compliance personnel, and audit committees personally
accountable for such risks.139 One of the major areas of focus is improving
the transparency of cyber-risks and guidelines for data breach
notifications.140 Beyond consumers, the effects of these threats on
shareholders is especially important—the SEC recently noted that
cybersecurity is the most significant risk currently facing the financial
system.141 Such risks affect investment decisions, stock value, and investor
access to information. Given the financial and reputational harm associated
with cybersecurity vulnerabilities, one survey revealed that 78% of investors
were “‘somewhat or very unlikely’ to invest in a company with a history of
being targeted in cyber-attacks,” while 69% of investors were hesitant to
invest in companies that have experienced one or more data breaches in their
time.142
This shareholder reluctance directly speaks to the core of “materiality,”
which is the reporting threshold mandated by the SEC and defined under the
federal securities laws as information that a reasonable investor would
consider important in deciding whether to make an investment. Materiality is
further defined as “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”143 Under
this objective standard, inadequate disclosure of cybersecurity threats is
likely to affect the investment decisions of shareholders, especially pertaining
to the costs that such risks pose on stock price, interrupted business activity,
stolen intellectual property, and the need for extra resources to purchase
insurance or ensure adequate executive involvement.144 Thus, it is to the
financial detriment of reporting companies to be lax in these disclosures.
(SEC) in this sector); Davis, Wong & Paterson, supra note 38, at 629 (discussing regulatory efforts
of the SEC, FTC, Federal Communication Commission, Department of Homeland Security, and
Department of Justice in this arena).
139. Davis, Wong & Paterson, supra note 38, at 618.
140. Melanie J. Teplinsky, Fiddling on the Roof: Recent Developments in Cybersecurity, 2 AM.
U. BUS. L. REV. 225, 277–79 (2013) (noting that “as of August 2012, forty-six states and the federal
government had adopted” some form of data breach notification law).
141. Lisa Lambert & Suzanne Barlyn, SEC Says Cybersecurity Biggest Risk to Financial System,
REUTERS (May 18, 2016, 7:07 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-finance-summit-sec-idUS
KCN0Y82K4.
142. MILLER, supra note 2, at 400.
143. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
144. See, e.g., Roberta Anderson & Katherine Blair, 5 Cybersecurity Considerations for Public
Companies, LAW360 (Feb. 10, 2014, 12:52 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/508038/5cybersecurity-considerations-for-public-companies (discussing Target as one example, whose stock
price fell over 10.5% after the mega data breach and prompted a shareholder derivative lawsuit);
Kevin M. Gatzlaff & Kathleen A. McCullough, The Effect of Data Breaches on Shareholder Wealth,
13 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 61 (2010) (utilizing event study methodology to conclude that the
stock market reacts negatively to data breaches); Robert S. Thomas, The Materiality Standard for
Intellectual Property Disclosures, 42 IDEA J.L. & TECH. 205, 225 (2002) (discussing the extent to
which disclosure of intellectual property information is considered material).
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They can ensure effectiveness by keeping abreast of any known cyber-risks
that could potentially hurt their bottom line and their shareholders.
Cybersecurity whistleblowers are well poised to contribute to these efforts by
escalating all cyber-related concerns to management or boards of directors
for prompt action.
Studies have revealed evidence that the stock market reacts more
negatively if an entity fails to provide sufficient details about a cyberbreach.145 Shareholders also commonly file derivative lawsuits in
conjunction with data breaches, which seek to impose personal liability on
directors or officers due to inadequate company management or disclosure
of cybersecurity risks and breaches of fiduciary duty based on
mismanagement.146 For example, the several shareholder derivative lawsuits
brought against Target alleged that top-level executives and directors waited
too long to publicly disclose the mega data breach, thereby creating further
damage and vulnerability to the company, and failed to take action despite
having internally received information about potential security breaches
several years prior.147
Although the effects of the Target breach affected the sanctity of
consumer debit and credit card information, the interest of shareholders in
the matter was enormous. Shareholders highlighted that the breach “on the
Company’s bottom line has been substantial” due to a damaged reputation
and customer base, weakened sales and lost revenues, and the need for the
company to reduce its fourth quarter 2013 adjusted earnings per share.148
Additional effects on market value included increased costs due to lowered
analyst ratings, price targets, and credit rating downgrades, various costs
associated with investigations into the breach and consulting services, and
numerous other related costs.149 In addition to asserting claims for breaches
of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and corporate waste, the shareholders
also called upon the company to “improve[] its corporate governance
145. Gatzlaff & McCullough, supra note 144, at 14, 17 (analyzing the effect of “firm response”
after a breach and the extent to which firms were forthcoming about the details of a breach after
having experienced one).
146. See, e.g., Trial Filing, Kulla v. Steinhafel, et al., No. 14-CV-00203(PAM-JJK), 2014 WL
2116594 (D. Minn. May 7, 2014) (representing the consolidated Target Corporation shareholder
derivative lawsuits, alleging claims against officers and directors for breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment, and corporate waste and seeking monetary relief “for these and other damages suffered
by Target as a result of the individual defendants breaches of fiduciary duties”); In re Heartland
Payment Sys., Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 09-1043, 2009 WL 4798148 (D.N.J. 2009)
(shareholders accused the company’s directors and officers of fraudulently misrepresenting the state
of data security in conference calls and financial statements); see also Victoria C. Wong,
Cybersecurity, Risk Management, and How Boards Can Effectively Fulfill Their Monitoring Role,
15 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 201, 206 (2015) (discussing several examples of shareholder derivative
lawsuits that seek to hold directors liable for improperly managing cybersecurity breaches).
147. See generally Kulla, 2014 WL 2116594 (claiming that many of these executives and
directors were aware of potential security breaches as early as 2007).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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structure.”150 As may be seen from these allegations, shareholder interest in
cybersecurity-related threats and data breaches is significant. Given that such
breaches directly correlate with the financial health of affected entities, it is
not surprising that the SEC, ever concerned with investor protection, has
asserted itself as a key regulator in this arena.
B. THE SEC’S CYBERSECURITY FOCUS AND AUTHORITY
In the 2011 Guidance, the SEC only briefly discussed the extent to which
public companies should report cybersecurity information under the
categories of “Description of Business,” “Legal Proceedings,” and
“Disclosure Controls and Procedures,” calling for general disclosure if cyberincidents materially affect a registrant’s “products, services, relationships
with customers or suppliers, or competitive conditions;” informing
registrants that they “may need to” disclose information regarding any
“material pending legal proceeding” involving cyber-incidents; and
prompting registrants to consider the extent to which cyber-incidents threaten
their ability to “record, process, summarize, and report [required]
information.”151 The SEC provided slightly more detail in describing
disclosure requirements under “Risk Factors” and “MD&A.” With respect to
risk-factor disclosure, the SEC urged reporting companies to disclose
whether the probability of cyber-incidents may render an investment in the
company “speculative or risky” by considering prior cyber-incidents, the
“quantitative and qualitative magnitude” of such risks, the risk that incidents
remain undetected, and the adequacy of “preventative actions taken . . . in the
context of the industry in which they operate.”152
Importantly, the 2011 Guidance discourages the use of “generic risk
disclosure” or “boilerplate” language to convey this information.153 Although
the SEC states that the federal securities laws would not require disclosure
that “itself would compromise a registrant’s cybersecurity,” registrants
“may” need to disclose existing or known threats to “place the discussion of
cybersecurity risks in context.”154 Under the MD&A category, the SEC calls
upon registrants to disclose cybersecurity risks and incidents if the costs
associated therewith represent a “material event, trend, or uncertainty that is
reasonably likely” to: i) materially affect operations, liquidity, or financial
condition; ii) lead to reduced revenues; iii) increase cybersecurity protection
costs; or iv) threaten intellectual property rights if the effects of such
incidents would be considered material.155
150. Id.
151. See Letter from John D. Rockefeller IV, supra note 69; Avellan, supra note 69, at 206–07;

see also CF-2 Disclosure Guidance, supra note 8.
152. CF-2 Disclosure Guidance, supra note 8, at 2.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id.
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As may be evident from reading the 2011 Guidance, companies are likely
to experience considerable difficulty in determining whether they meet the
materiality threshold for cyber-related disclosures given the lack of specific
examples and general language. Further, the inability to use “boilerplate”
language imposes a confusing standard on public companies as to the
generality of their disclosures. Several commentators have already discussed
the deficiencies of the 2011 Guidance, describing the guidelines as
ambiguous and void of explicit definitions to adequately explain what type
of information should be subject to disclosure or provide specific dollar or
percentage amounts.156 Further, there is also a risk that companies may reveal
too much data and actually invite more cyber-risks, or make it easier for
attackers to access their information systems.157
Because the 2011 Guidance is not a binding regulation, some have
argued that the SEC’s reliance on the 2011 Guidance, as an enforcement
mechanism to target companies for providing what the agency deems
insufficient cybersecurity disclosures, is a violation of administrative law.158
Despite its mere advisory nature, the SEC has relied on the 2011 Guidance
to threaten reporting companies with investigations, enforcement activity,
and other penalties for non-compliance. In the eighteen months subsequent
to the issuance of the 2011 Guidance, the SEC circulated comment letters to
about fifty public companies to request information regarding their
information security and cyber-related activity practices, which effectively
required reporting companies to disclose information about past incidents.159
Shortly thereafter, the SEC began to utilize actual enforcement mechanisms
to ensure compliance with the 2011 Guidance by routinely policing whether
reporting companies had adequately disclosed material information both after
a known cyber-incident and on an ongoing basis to communicate the
existence of cybersecurity risks.160
The SEC has also specifically relied on the 2011 Guidance in imposing
additional public reporting obligations on several well-known companies,
156. See, e.g., Avellan, supra note 69; Ferraro, supra note 92; see generally Young, supra note
92 (emphasizing the need for the SEC to establish a dollar threshold for prevention costs for
cyberattacks, mitigations costs, and losses that, if exceeded, would require disclosure); Joel
Bronstein, The Balance Between Informing Investors and Protecting Companies: A Look at the
Division of Corporation Finance’s Recent Guidelines on Cybersecurity Disclosure Requirements,
13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 257, 279 (2012) (discussing the inadequacies of the 2011 Guidance).
157. See, e.g., Bronstein, supra note 156, at 280–81; Jeff Roberts, Will New SEC Guidelines Play
Into The Hands of Cyber Attackers?, GIGAOM (Nov. 14, 2011, 7:16 PM), https://gigaom.com/2011
/11/14/419-will-new-sec-guidelines-play-into-the-hands-of-cyber-attackers/.
158. See, e.g., Ferraro, supra note 92, at 320–22 (discussing the non-binding effect of a nonlegislative rule); Avellan, supra note 69, at 219 (noting that the 2011 Guidance “does not carry the
authority of an official regulation”).
159. Daniel F. Schubert, Jonathan G. Cedarbaum & Leah Schloss, The SEC’s Two Primary
Theories in Cybersecurity Enforcement Actions, THE CYBERSECURITY L. REPORT, Apr. 2015
(citing Letter from Mary Schapiro, Former Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Sen. John D.
Rockefeller IV (May 1, 2013)).
160. See id.
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leading these companies to believe that failure to respond would result in
costly analysis and negative consequences, despite the fact that, in reality,
there is no underlying binding force behind the guidance as an enforcement
mechanism.161 These SEC inquiries have led to the use of comment letters by
the agency to request revised or improved risk-factor disclosure regarding
cybersecurity risk reporting and general monitoring of company press
coverage of such events.162 Given the explicit internal disclaimer as to the
non-binding nature of the 2011 Guidance, the lack of publication in the
Federal Register, and the absence of any notice-and-comment period
soliciting feedback as to proposed regulations, the 2011 Guidance has been
described as having the same effect as a “speech an SEC staffer gave at a
public conference about cybersecurity.”163
In areas beyond public company disclosures, the SEC has used its
regulatory authority to promulgate binding cybersecurity regulations. The
SEC’s Regulation SCI is binding on self-regulatory organizations (SROs)
like FINRA, alternative trading systems (ATSs), plan processors, and
clearing agencies (collectively, SCI entities), requiring such entities to adopt
procedures to ensure that their automated systems “have levels of capacity,
integrity, resiliency, availability, and security adequate to maintain their
operational capability and promote the maintenance of fair and orderly
markets.”164 These procedures include mandated participation in the
scheduled testing of business continuity operations and backup and disaster
recovery plans; the coordination of this testing among other SCI entities; and
the need to take corrective action with respect to systems disruptions and
compliance issues, including mandated notices and reports to the SEC.165
Similarly, Regulation S-ID, under which the SEC issued joint rules with
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), requires financial
institutions and creditors to design and implement written identity theft
programs to protect the personal information of existing and prospective
clients.166 Regulation S-P is another related SEC regulation that is binding on
investment advisers registered with the SEC, brokers, dealers, and investment

161. See id. (discussing several case studies of instances in which corporations altered their SEC
disclosures based on the SEC’s request through reliance on the 2011 Guidance); Avellan, supra
note 69.
162. David B.H. Martin et al., SEC Activity Trends in Cybersecurity and Securities Law, INSIDE
COUNS. (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/04/14/sec-activity-trends-in-cyber
security-and-securitie.
163. Ferraro, supra note 92, at 323.
164. 17 C.F.R. § 242.1001 (2016); Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, Exchange Act
Release No. 73,639, 110 SEC Docket 1377 (Feb. 3, 2015).
165. 17 C.F.R. § 242.1001; Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, Exchange Act Release
No. 73,639, 110 SEC Docket 1377.
166. Identity Theft Red Flags Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 69,359, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 3582, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,456, 106 SEC Docket 165 (Apr. 10,
2013).
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companies.167 Regulation S-P mandates financial institutions to provide
customers with notice of the institution’s privacy procedures and prohibits
the disclosure of personal consumer information to non-affiliated third
parties.168 In September 2015, the SEC pursued its first enforcement action
specifically relating to cybersecurity against investment adviser R.T. Jones
Capital Equities Management, which agreed to a cease-and-desist order and
a $75,000 penalty for failure to adopt Regulation S-P’s required
cybersecurity procedures, which had led to a breach that compromised the
personal information of nearly 100,000 individuals.169 This information was
revealed after an SEC investigation found that the company had violated the
“safeguards rule” of Regulation S-P by storing sensitive client information
on a third-party web server, which was then attacked by an unknown
hacker.170 This enforcement action is further evidence of the agency’s
commitment to policing the financial markets for cybersecurity noncompliance.171
The SEC regulations described above are binding on SCI entities,
financial institutions, creditors, investment advisors, brokers, dealers, and
investment companies, thereby offering a legitimate enforcement mechanism
to the agency to pursue inadequacies related to cybersecurity efforts. Similar
SEC regulations, with the force of law, could be imposed on public
companies to transform the 2011 Guidance into binding cybersecurity
regulation. Such action is likely to assist companies in establishing clear and
effective channels of information gathering and reporting while also ensuring
that the reports of cybersecurity whistleblowers unquestionably constitute
activities that are statutorily protected from retaliation.
The SEC may transform the 2011 Guidance into binding regulations
pursuant to its general rulemaking authority under various provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act that allow the SEC to adopt
regulations it deems “necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.”172 The SEC has considerable leeway in enacting
167. Privacy of Consumer Financial Information (Regulation S-P), Exchange Act Release No.
42,974, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,543, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1883,
72 SEC Docket 1694 (Nov. 13, 2000) (implementing the requirements of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act).
168. Id.
169. Press Release, SEC Charges Investment Adviser, supra note 16.
170. Id.
171. See id.; SEC Announces First Cybersecurity Enforcement Action Against an Investment
Adviser for Failure to Protect Client Data, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.natlawreview
.com/article/sec-announces-first-cybersecurity-enforcement-action-against-investment-adviser#sth
ash.BvPeWhCx.dpuf.
172. See, e.g., Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78m (2012)); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 78j(b); see also Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency
Criterion for Securities Regulation: Investor Welfare or Total Surplus?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 94
n.37 (2015) (noting that “[t]his phrase appears very frequently and verbatim throughout the SEC’s
organic statutes); Lawrence J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, The SEC & The Internet:
Regulating the Web of Deceit, 68 THE CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 262, 272 (2014) (discussing
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regulations aimed at ensuring investor protection generally, which is
ubiquitous among the various securities regulation statutes, including the
general anti-fraud prohibition in Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.173 The
SEC intended its 2011 Guidance to assist public companies in preparing
disclosures in registration statements, periodic reports under the Exchange
Act, and in ensuring that “statements and omissions both inside and outside
of [SEC] filings” are compliant with “the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws.”174 As such, the SEC has expressed that the disclosures
mandate compliance with a number of federal securities law provisions.175
An additional source of SEC rulemaking authority for cybersecurity
regulations may be found in the proxy disclosure provisions of Section 14(a)
of the Exchange Act, which authorizes the SEC to broadly promulgate proxy
disclosure regulations “in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.”176 As some scholars have noted, the authority of the SEC to
promulgate proxy disclosure regulations in the “public interest” may be even
more expansive than the authority to do so to ensure investor protection, as
the former may be interpreted, through legislative history and examination of
the federal securities laws, to authorize rulemaking efforts to promote social
disclosures (as opposed to only financial disclosures) promoting corporate
social transparency.177 Social disclosures may include information such as
the nature of the company’s products, the countries in which it conducts
business, and the community and political effects of a company’s operations
in the United States and abroad,178 with the goal of making directors more
responsive to the public interest and the promotion of effective corporate
governance measures.179 Given the importance of cybersecurity-related
authority of the SEC to regulate internet and cyber-related issues); Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud
Prohibitions Are Not Enough: The Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the
Economic Case for Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 362 n.39
(2002) (describing the various authority of the SEC to “craft rules ‘for the protection of investors’”).
173. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j; Michael D. Guttentag, Protection from What? Investor Protection
and the Jobs Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207, 212–13 (2013) (noting that “[t]he ubiquity of
investor protection as a goal in securities regulation in the United States is evident from an
inspection of the securities regulation statutes themselves,” including the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the latter of which discusses “investor protection” over 200
times); see also Lee, supra note 172, at n.37 (discussing the SEC’s broad rulemaking authority).
174. CF-2 Disclosure Guidance, supra note 8, at n.2, 3.
175. See generally CF-2 Disclosure Guidance, supra note 8.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 78n.
177. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1199, 1236–46, 1274 (1999) (discussing the SEC’s
authority to require from public companies expanded social and corporate accountability
disclosures).
178. Id.
179. See Roberta S. Karmel, Qualitative Standards for ‘Qualified Securities’: Sec Regulation of
Voting Rights, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 824 (1987) (noting the SEC’s role in this arena); see also
Philip C. Berg, The Limits of Sec Authority Under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act: Where Federal
Disclosure Ends and State Corporate Governance Begins, 17 J. CORP. L. 311, 323–24 (1992)
(discussing academic commentary on the SEC’s broad rulemaking authority under Section 14(a)
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information to investors as material information and to the public at large,
the promulgation of regulations specifically mandating cybersecurity
disclosures is arguably well within the SEC’s rulemaking mandate to enact
regulations both for the protection of investors and in support of the public
interest.
CONCLUSION
Cybersecurity whistleblowers help mitigate the harmful effects of cyberbreaches, cyber-risks and other related threats by contributing to a
communication-intensive corporate culture that more effectively discovers
and remediates these problems. The SEC is increasingly focused on soliciting
disclosures from public companies about their cybersecurity threats and
encouraging boards of directors and compliance officers to take on a
heightened role in collecting and managing such information. Given the nonbinding status of the SEC’s 2011 Guidance and the narrow judicial
interpretations of the retaliation protections available under the SOX and
Dodd-Frank whistleblower programs, cybersecurity whistleblowers are
likely to be excluded from these statutory protections due to their reports
falling outside the realm of “protected activity” enumerated in these statutes.
This gap in the law is likely to discourage cybersecurity whistleblowers from
making the types of internal reports that are conducive to effective
cybersecurity compliance. The transformation of the 2011 Guidance into
binding regulation would ensure that cybersecurity whistleblowers are fully
protected from any retaliation they may experience and that the value of the
information they provide is fully appreciated by both regulated entities and
the SEC.

and noting that Professor Louis Loss has also “characterize[d] the SEC’s section 14(a) power as
‘quasi-legislative’”).

